Hospitals and Health Care Facilities

On August 15, 2017, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Tom Price, issued a press release reporting that almost $105 million dollars will be bestowed upon 1,333 health centers across the United States, including its territories; and Washington D.C. Secretary Price stated “Americans deserve a healthcare system that’s affordable, accessible, of the highest quality, with ample choices, driven by world-leading innovations, and responsive to the needs of the individual patient. Supporting health centers across the country helps achieve that mission.”

According to the Health Resources & Services Administration, also known as HRSA, federally qualified health centers (FQHC) “are community-based and patient-directed organizations that deliver comprehensive, culturally competent, high-quality primary health care services.”  The main function of a health center is to provide health services to underprivileged patients where affordable healthcare is either lacking or nonexistent. Services include, but are not limited to, mental health support, substance abuse aid, dental health and many other services. While there are numerous requirements for an organization to qualify as a FQHC, one interesting qualification is that the organization must elect members of the community to serve on its governing board—ensuring that the community has a role when it comes to its own healthcare.

Even though the concept of a health center may be foreign to many in the United States, health centers play an important role in our society.  HRSA has concluded that, based on data from its Uniform Data System, almost 26 million individuals (which equals 1 in every 12 people living in the United States) depended on a health center for health services in 2016, including more than 330,000 veterans. The study also found that 1 in every 3 people living in poverty relied on a health center in 2016.

Living in a politically toxic climate on the topic of healthcare and its reforms, as we currently do today, brings in a breath of fresh air to see our tax dollars being put to good use. Health centers have served as a unique and beneficial service for the underserved and underprivileged for the last 50 years, and the federal government’s continued support appears to be unwavering.

In follow-up to our prior blog post, Concierge Medicine – Is it for you?, we recognize that while a concierge or direct-pay practice might be a good choice for a physician or physician practice group, patients do not necessarily feel the same way.  When patients hear that a medical practice is a “concierge” or “direct-pay” practice, they often think of prohibitively high out of pocket costs.  One way for a concierge or direct-pay practice to be more enticing to patients is to structure its billing methods so patients may be able to obtain reimbursement from their health savings account (HSA) or flexible spending account (FSA) for some of the associated costs.  Generally, access fees will not be reimbursable through either a HSA or FSA.  But costs incurred for qualified medical services actually rendered to the patient may be.  Here are some quick rules of thumb for when HSA and/or FSA reimbursement may be applicable to cover such costs:

 

Fees for Qualified Medical Services:  Any fees charged for qualified medical care (generally defined under the Internal Revenue Code to include the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease) are generally reimbursable under a HSA or FSA, to the extent not reimbursed by the patient’s insurance.

 

Access Fees or Subscription Fees:  Fees related solely to having access to a physician will not be reimbursable under either a HSA or FSA.  This is because they are not fees for qualified medical services, but rather are more akin to insurance premiums (which are also not reimbursable under a HSA or FSA).  Such non-reimbursable fees would include fees for admission as a patient, monthly retainer fees, fees for a reduced wait time, fees for 24 hour access to a physician, or any other fees not directly related to the rendering of medical services.

 

Prepaid Fees for Qualified Medical Services:  If an access fee or subscription fee includes a prepaid fee for a qualified medical service (for example, the annual fee includes the cost of a comprehensive physical examination), any costs attributable to that medical service that are not reimbursed by insurance may be reimbursable under a HSA or FSA, but not until such time as the service is actually rendered to the patient.

 

In order for patients to be able to take advantage of reimbursement from their HSA or FSA, they must have appropriate supporting documentation for the qualified medical service.  Documentation should include the patient’s name, the date of service, the type of service, and the fair market value charge attributable to just the medical service portion of the patient’s bill.

 

In sum, concierge and direct-pay practices can work for physicians on account of the upfront fees paid by patients.  However, if such fees include prepayment for medical services, it will not only encourage patients to take advantage of preventative care but may also enable them to recoup part of their upfront costs from their HSA or FSA once such services have been rendered.

 

Next week, look for the release of Medical Marijuana 102, a follow-up blog post to Veronique Urban’s Medical Marijuana 101:  The State of the Law in NY.  This will be the second blog post in a series of articles discussing the current state of the law in New York regarding medical marijuana.

Last week, the Second Circuit held that a False Claims Act relator does not have to plead details of specific alleged false billings or invoices to the government, as long as he can allege facts leading to a strong inference that specific claims were submitted and that information about them are peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge.

In United States ex rel. Chorches v. American Medical Response, Inc., Paul Fabula was an emergency medical technician for AMR, the largest ambulance company in the United States. He alleged that AMR falsely certified ambulance transports as being medically necessary and submitted claims it knew were not medically reimbursable under Medicaid. He alleged that AMR routinely made EMTs and paramedics revise or re-create reports to include false statements demonstrating medical necessity in order to qualify for Medicaid reimbursement. Fabula subsequently declared bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee became the relator.

Qui tam complaints, which allege fraud, are subject to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s particularity requirement. The Second Circuit determined that relator had adequately alleged a scheme to defraud. Relator, however, admittedly did not have personal knowledge of exact billing numbers, dates, or amounts for claims submitted to the government.

The focus of the Second Circuit’s inquiry, therefore, was whether every qui tam complaint must allege specific identified false billings or invoices. The Court answered in the negative, holding that “a complaint can satisfy Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement by making plausible allegations creating a strong inference that specific false claims were submitted to the government and that the information that would permit further identification of those claims is peculiarly within the opposing party’s knowledge.”

In Chorches, the Court found that the relator had met this standard by pleading sufficient facts, on personal knowledge, to demonstrate that billing information was peculiarly within the knowledge of AMR and that he was unable, without the benefit of discovery, to provide billing details for claims submitted by AMR to the government. Relator had also sufficiently alleged facts on personal knowledge supporting a scheme to defraud and a strong inference that false claims were actually submitted to the government.

This issue had been addressed by several other circuits, and in 2016, the Second Circuit noted a seeming circuit split on whether an FCA relator must allege the details of specific examples of actual false claims. In Chorches, however, the Court concluded that “reports of a circuit split are, like those prematurely reporting Mark Twain’s death, ‘greatly exaggerated.’” The Court then engaged in an extensive analysis of cases in other circuits, concluding that its pleading standard is fully consistent with both the emerging consensus in other circuits and its own precedents.

Several district courts in the Second Circuit have required a strict pleading of specific facts concerning individual billings or invoices to the government. Those decisions will now have to be re-examined in light of the pleading standard set by the Second Circuit in Chorches: “Rule 9(b) does not require that every qui tam complaint provide details of actual bills or invoices submitted to the government, so long as the relator makes plausible allegations . . . that lead to a strong inference that specific claims were indeed submitted and that information about the claims submitted are peculiarly within the opposing party’s knowledge.”

The Second Circuit also held in Chorches that the FCA’s public disclosure bar is not jurisdictional, and that an alleged refusal to falsify a patient report is sufficient at the pleading stage to qualify as protected activity for an FCA retaliation claim.

On June 14, 2017, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Breckinridge Health, Inc., et al. v. Price affirmed the district court’s finding that HHS could offset the amount of a hospital’s Medicare reimbursement by the Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payments received by such hospital.  In its decision, the Sixth Circuit followed the holding of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in its 2012 decision in Abraham Lincoln Memorial Hospital v. Sebelius, where the Seventh Circuit, under similar facts, came to the same conclusion.

 

Breckinridge Health involved various Kentucky Critical Access Hospitals that, as part of Kentucky’s contribution to the DSH program, must pay a 2.5% tax on their gross revenue (the KP-Tax).  The revenue from the KP-Tax is then deposited into the Medical Assistance Revolving Trust under Kentucky law.  Funds from the revolving trust are then used to fund, in part, the DSH payments made to Kentucky hospitals.

 

The hospitals in this case had historically sought and received reimbursement under the Medicare Act’s reasonable cost statute for the full amount of their 2.5% tax payment.  However, for 2009 and 2010, full reimbursement was denied by the Medicare Administrative Contractor.  Instead, each hospital’s tax costs were offset against the amount of Medicaid DSH payments such hospital actually received.  This decision was upheld by the Provider Reimbursement Review Board and later the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and, finally, the district court.

 

In affirming the district court’s decision, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Seventh Circuit’s rationale in Abraham Lincoln Memorial Hospital.  There, Illinois hospitals paid a tax assessment to the state as a condition of participation in Medicaid “access payments.”  The Seventh Circuit found that the tax assessment was a reasonable cost eligible for Medicare reimbursement.  However, because the payments the Illinois hospitals received from the fund were meant to reduce expenses associated with participation in the program, including the expense of paying the mandatory tax assessment that is a condition to participation, the set off was appropriate because the net economic impact of the access payments must be considered in calculating the reimbursement.

 

Applying the Seventh Circuit’s rationale, the Breckinridge court reasoned that “[b]ecause the DSH payment [the hospitals] received derived from the fund into which the [hospitals’] KP-Tax expenditures were placed, the net effect of the DSH payment is to reduce, at least in part, the costs [the hospitals] incurred in paying the KP-Tax.  Therefore, it constituted a refund notwithstanding the fact that it was not labeled as such.”  In other words, by receiving a return of the economic value of their KP-Tax payments through the disbursement of revolving trust funds, the hospitals essentially had already been reimbursed for their KP-Tax payments and such costs were not eligible to be reimbursed again under the reasonable cost statute.

 

In affirming the district court’s judgment, the Sixth Circuit made clear that the standard of review is to give the judgment of HHS controlling weight unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  However, through its detailed review of HHS’s decision, the Breckinridge court bolsters the rationale arguably justifying the expanding view that DSH payments can properly be set off against the reasonable costs of participation.

The Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (MCFU) of the New York State Office of the Attorney General has recently issued restitution demand letters to providers for allegedly entering into percentage-based contracts with their billing agents. The MCFU letters cite the Medicaid Update March 2001, titled “A Message for Providers Using Service Agents as follows:

Billing agents are prohibited from charging Medicaid providers a percentage of the amount claimed or collected. In addition, such payment arraignments, when entered into by a physician, may violate the Education Law and State Education Department’s regulations on unlawful fee-splitting.

A physician will be guilty of misconduct if he or she permits:

any person to share in the fees for professional services, other than: a partner, employee, associate in a professional firm or corporation, professional subcontractor or consultant authorized to practice medicine, or a legally authorized trainee practicing under the supervision of a licensee. This prohibition shall include any arrangement or agreement whereby the amount received in payment for furnishing space, facilities, equipment or personnel services used by a licensee constitutes a percentage of, or is otherwise dependent upon, the income or receipts of the licensee from such practice, except as otherwise provided by law with respect to a facility licensed pursuant to article twenty-eight of the public health law or article thirteen of the mental hygiene law.

See Educ. Law §6530(19)*.

A physician is subject to professional misconduct charges if he or she has

directly or indirectly requested, received or participated in the division, transference, assignment, rebate, splitting, or refunding of a fee for, or has directly requested, received or profited by means of a credit or other valuable consideration as a commission, discount or gratuity, in connection with the furnishing of professional care or service . . .

See Educ. Law §6531.

The prohibition against fee-splitting is related to the state anti-kickback law which prohibits physicians from

[d]irectly or indirectly offering, giving, soliciting, or receiving or agreeing to receive, any fee or other consideration to or from a third party for the referral of a patient or in connection with the performance of professional services . . .

See Educ. Law §6530 (18).

Licensed professionals in New York State must review their contracts to verify that the compensation paid to their agents is not based on a percentage of fees for professional services.

*A similar rule applies to other licensed professionals. See N.Y. Rules of the Board of Regents §29.1(b)(4).

**In addition to the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute at 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7b(b), New York has enacted its own wide-reaching anti-kickback and anti-referral laws and regulations seeking to eliminate fraud and abuse in healthcare on a statewide basis. The state anti-kickback statue is set forth in the Social Services Law (See N.Y. Social Services Law § 366-d). The N.Y. Education Law addresses matters of professional misconduct rather than violations of fraud and abuse laws and regulations.

imagesPA8ET6EQIn our previous post [found here], we explained that, under the Privacy Rule, HIPAA covered entities (health care providers and health plans) must provide individuals and their “personal representatives” with access to the individual’s protected health information. An individual’s personal representative is determined under State law. In this post, we will define who is a “personal representative” under New York law.

Section 18(2) of the New York Public Health Law (PHL) states that, upon written request, a health care provider shall provide an opportunity, within ten days, for a patient to inspect the patient’s information concerning or relating to the examination or treatment of the patient. Upon the written request of any qualified person, a health care provider shall furnish to the qualified person, within a reasonable time, a copy of any patient information requested which the authorized person may inspect. The law provides no specific time period by which copies of medical records must be provided. However, the New York State Department of Health considers 10 to 14 days to be a reasonable time in which a practitioner should respond to such a request.

A “qualified person” under PHL§ 18(1)(g) includes:

  1. the properly identified patient;
  2. a guardian for an incapacitated person appointed under article eighty-one of the mental hygiene law;
  3. a parent of an infant or a guardian of an infant appointed under article seventeen of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act or other legally appointed guardian of an infant who may request access to a clinical record;
  4. a distributee of any deceased subject for whom no personal representative, as defined in the Estates, Powers and Trusts Law, has been appointed; or
  5. an attorney representing a qualified person or the subject’s estate who holds a power of attorney from the qualified person or the subject’s estate explicitly authorizing the holder to execute a written request for patient information.

PHL§ 18(1)(g) states that a qualified person shall be deemed a “personal representative of the individual” for purposes of HIPAA and its implementing regulations. Although not a “qualified person,” an agent appointed under a patient’s Health Care Proxy may also receive medical information and medical and clinical records necessary to make informed decisions regarding the patient’s health care (See PHL § 2982(3)). Presumably, the holder of a Health Care Proxy would also be a “personal representative of the individual” for purposes of HIPAA, although there is no explicit statement to that effect in PHL § 2982.

There are circumstances where a qualified person may be denied access to inspect or obtain a copy of the patient’s records. In the next post, we will explain those circumstances.

Picture1Under the Privacy Rule, HIPAA covered entities (health care providers and health plans) are required to provide individuals, upon request, with access to their protected health information (PHI) in one or more “designated record sets” maintained by or for the covered entity.

Covered entities are also required to protect the individual’s PHI from unauthorized disclosure. How must a covered entity verify the identity of the individual requesting the PHI so as to comply with the Privacy Rule without at the same time violating it?

Recent guidance from the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is somewhat helpful.

According the guidance, the Privacy Rule requires a covered entity to take “reasonable steps” to verify the identity of an individual requesting access (citing 45 CFR 164.514(h)).  OCR confirms the Privacy Rule does not mandate the form of verification, but rather leaves the manner of verification to the professional judgment of the covered entity, provided the verification processes and measures “do not create barriers to or unreasonably delay the individual from obtaining access to her PHI”.  OCR explains that verification may be oral or in writing and states that the type of verification depends on how the individual is requesting or receiving access. For instance, a person may request access in person, by phone, by fax or e-mail, or through a web portal hosted by the covered entity.

OCR suggests that standard request forms ask for basic information about the individual to enable the covered entity to verify the individual is the subject of the information requested.  For those covered entities providing individuals with access to their PHI through web portals, the portals should be set up with appropriate authentication controls, as required by the HIPAA Security Rule (for instance password protection and required periodic password updates).

For individuals who may call requesting access to their PHI, good policy might require verification of the requestors date of birth, address, and perhaps the condition the individual was treated for.

Verifying the authority of an individual’s personal representative is determined under State law. In the next blog post, we will look at the law in New York on who is a qualified person for purposes of access to an individual’s medical records.

On November 10, 2014, the US Department of Health and Human Services released its investigation report regarding the death of actress and comedian Joan Rivers.  The report, called a “Statement of Deficiencies and Plan of Correction”, highlights numerous mistakes and violations made by Yorkville Endoscopy, the treating facility where Ms. Rivers died (Ms. Rivers was identified as “Patient #1”).  Health care providers, facility owners, and administrators can learn some basic but important lessons from the report’s findings. 

1. Have appropriate policies and procedures (“P&Ps”) in place as required by your licensing agency and accrediting body.  Yorkville Endoscopy is licensed by the State of New York as an ambulatory surgery center (“ASC”) under Article 28 of the Public Health Law, and accredited by the American Association for Accreditation of Ambulatory Surgery Facilities.  The State regulatory requirements for an ASC are much more rigorous than the requirements for non-licensed outpatient surgery centers in New York.  P&Ps cover issues including clinical practices, patient consents, procedures, anesthesia, billing, provider credentialing, employment and more.  An administrator, compliance officer, or other responsible party may review the regulations and accreditation standards, consult with the accrediting body, legal counsel or a consultant, and can purchase policy manuals from numerous sources.  

2. Follow your own policies and procedures.  The report cites numerous examples of Yorkville Endoscopy failing to follow its own P&Ps.  For example, the staff failed to follow the “Time Out” policy which helps ensure that the correct procedure is being performed; also, one of the physicians performing the procedures was not credentialed by the facility, in violation of the Physician Credentialing P&P. A facility’s P&P manual should not be gathering dust on a shelf in a back office (same goes for the Compliance Manual).  If a particular policy or procedure is not effective, the facility should develop a new policy or procedure that works better.  A facility that consistently follows its own P&Ps exhibits traits of a compliant and quality oriented organization; while this will not prevent accidents or unexpected occurrences, many issues may be avoided.  All staff, including physicians, should be regularly educated on the facility’s P&Ps.

3. Credentialing protects you.  The federal report stated that one of the physicians performing a procedure on Ms. Rivers was not credentialed by the facility.  Credentialing is a fairly simple process that allows a facility to review a provider’s licensure, education and work history, insurance, and past lawsuits or disciplinary actions before allowing them to treat patients.  This enables a facility to determine whether a provider meets facility requirements in general, and often whether they are qualified for specific procedures.  This helps weed out bad providers up front, limits certain procedures to physicians with an appropriate level of training and experience, and allows the facility to have a record of who is providing services under its roof.

4. Keep the cameras away from the patients.  The report notes that one of the physicians took a photograph of Ms. Rivers with his cell phone while she was under sedation during a procedure.  There is no evidence she consented to this photo.  This is a violation of Ms. Rivers’ right to privacy (under HIPAA and State laws), and violated the facility’s own “Cell Phone Policy.”  Taking photos of patients without their consent exposes the individuals and their facilities to liability, and often results in loss of employment for the offending staff.  Facilities should review their photo and video policies, with an eye toward protection of the privacy of patients, staff and guests.

5. Beware of “VIP Medicine”. Accommodating a VIP in certain ways is reasonable and acceptable, but it is not occasion to ignore important policies and procedures.  The investigation states that Ms. Rivers’ medical record did not contain an informed consent for the nasolaryngoscopy, and contained no documentation of her body weight (needed to calculate anesthesia dosages).  Allowing a VIP to enter though a separate door to increase their privacy, keeping their visit private, or using a private room are certainly appropriate.  However, clinical guidelines should be followed regardless of the star power of the patient.  This means they must be subject to the same clinical oversight, undergo the same process for obtaining informed consent for any procedure, and receive the same pre-procedure screening and testing in accordance with good medical practices.

It is unknown whether compliance with any of the above-noted issues would have resulted in a better outcome for Ms. Rivers – sometimes the negative risks discussed during the informed consent process do occur, and sometimes this results in the death of a patient.  What is clear is that inattention to regulations, failing to follow basic policies and procedures, and violating a patient’s rights suggest a facility and providers that fail to place a high value on quality of care and the safety of their patients.

When does the 60-day clock start for an identified overpayment of federal funds to become a reverse false claim under amendments to the False Claims Act?  A closely watched SDNY qui tam  case may provide an answer. 

In June, the United States and New York intervened in United States v. Continuum Health Partners, Inc., alleging that defendants had knowingly failed to return overpayments owed to Medicaid arising out of a computer glitch.  Defendants have now filed motions to dismiss the Federal and New York State FCA claims. 

In 2009, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act defined “obligation” in the FCA to include “the retention of an overpayment.”  The following year, in 2010, the Affordable Care Act provided that an overpayment of federal funds must be reported and returned within “60 days after the date on which the overpayment was identified.”  In addition, the ACA amendments provided that the failure to return an overpayment in 60 days constitutes a reverse false claim, subjecting the provider to treble damages and civil penalties under the FCA. 

In their motion to dismiss, Beth Israel Medical Center, St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hospital Center, and Continuum Health Partners argued that there was never an “obligation” to the Federal government, because there must be a present, existing duty to repay.  Defendants asserted that an overpayment is not “identified” unless it has been confirmed and quantified, and the 60 day period does not start until that occurs.  Defendants referenced the process most providers undertake when they become aware of a potential overpayment, including an internal audit, sampling of claims, consultations with physicians and staff, and factual and legal analysis.  This process ordinarily cannot occur within 60 days of initially becoming aware of a potential overpayment. 

The complaint attached an internal summary, by one of Continuum’s employees, of approximately 900 Medicaid claims, totaling over $1 million, that were potential overpayments.  Defendants stressed that this was not a list of actual overpayments, and in fact only 465 of the claims were paid.  As further analysis was required to determine if the claims did result in overpayments, defendants argued that the summary did not “identify” overpayments, and the complaint therefore did not allege any obligation owed the government under the FCA. 

Defendants also argued that the complaint failed to allege any affirmative act of concealment to prevent an overpayment from being disclosed, and that an overpayment from Medicaid is not an obligation owed to the Federal government under the reverse false claim section of the FCA.  In a separate memorandum seeking to dismiss the state FCA claims, defendants incorporated their Federal FCA arguments and also argued that the state reverse false claim provision was enacted after the alleged conduct, and therefore could not be applied retroactively. 

This case is being closely watched, as it raises significant issues on when the government can assert reverse false claim liability for overpayments.  Significantly, in this case, there is no dispute that the overpayments resulted from a computer glitch and not fraud, and that defendants repaid the overpayment to the government.  The complaint alleges that defendants did not make that payment soon enough.  The government intervened to seek treble damages and civil penalties, signaling that it will be aggressively pursuing cases where providers become aware of overpayments and fail — in the government’s view — to promptly reimburse the government. 

The case is pending before SDNY District Judge Edgardo Ramos, and the government opposition papers are due on October 22.

Physicians often practice through a limited liability entity to shield the physician from practice liabilities. In New York, such entities may take the form of a professional service corporation, professional limited liability company, or professional limited liability partnership. Regardless of the type of entity selected, professionals in New York remain “personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful act or misconduct committed by him or her or by any person under his or her direct supervision and control while rendering professional services on behalf of [the entity],” See NY BCL§1505(a); NY LLCL §1205; N.Y. PTR. LAW § 26(c).

The issue of whether certain alleged tortfeasers were under a physician-shareholder’s “direct supervision and control” was recently presented in Schaefer v. Mackinnon, 117235/09, NYLJ 1202669507383, at *1 (Sup., NY, Decided August 27, 2014). In Schaefer, Plaintiffs Frank Schaefer and his wife, Maria Schaefer, brought a medical malpractice suit against Broadway Cardiopulmonary, P.C. and its four shareholders for injuries Mr. Schaefer sustained during a cardiac stress test. Additional defendants include the alleged tortfeasers, David Mackinnon, M.D., a non-shareholder physician, a medical assistant and a medical technologist, all employees of Broadway Cardiopulmonary, P.C.  According to the record, the test was ordered by Dr. Mackinnon, but Dr. Mackinnon did not interview or examine Mr. Schaefer prior to or during the course of testing. The test was administered by the medical technologist who apparently left the room during testing. Mr. Schaefer passed out and fell resulting in injuries.

The defendant shareholders moved for summary judgment arguing they did not directly supervise or control the alleged tortfeasers during the rendering of professional services as the test was performed by the other named defendants and not the shareholders. Plaintiffs opposed the motion stating the shareholders failed to implement guidelines, controls and procedures for proper and safe testing.

In analyzing the issue, Justice Joan B. Lobis looked to the Appellate Divisions ruling in Wise v. Greenwald, 208 A.D.2d 1141 (3rd Dep’t 1994).

“In Wise, the appellate court considered the liability under Section 1505(a) of the Business Corporation Law of a shareholder of a dental practice, whose employee dentist allegedly negligently extracted Wise’s tooth. Indicia of liability included the shareholder’s hiring responsibilities, setting hours of operation, evaluation of employees, and whether any intermediary supervisor lay between the shareholder and employee whose actions were at issue. Id. at 1142. Applying these factors, the Wise Court affirmed the denial of the shareholder’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1143.”

Turning to the case at hand, Justice Lobis looked to the testimony of the defendants finding that

• the four shareholders met at least every two months to discuss practice operations;

• all four shareholders signed the office lease, approved of the imaging machine at issue, and ordered medical and office supplies;

• all four shareholders hired and/or evaluated Dr. Mackinnon and the defendant medical technologist;

• one of the shareholders regularly discussed operational issues and staff scheduling with Dr. Mackinnon;

• the shareholders had the power to terminate employees;

• the medical technologist testified he reported directly to one of the shareholders yet he had not been trained or given procedures to follow in operating the imaging machine, he failed to monitor blood pressure, respiration or pulse before the resting portion of the stress test and he was not instructed to remain in the room with the patient during the equipment’s operation.

Based on the record, Justice Lobis found that genuine issues of material fact remain for a jury to determine whether the shareholders are liable for the actions of other persons at the practice.

Direct supervision and control by a shareholder-physician goes beyond supervision of the professional care provided. Shareholder-physicians who take on administrative oversight  responsibilities can be liable if they fail to properly train and control persons rendering professional services for the practice.