Last week, in United States v. Scully, the Second Circuit vacated the conviction of a distributor of pharmaceutical products on misbranding charges due to evidentiary issues surrounding his advice-of-counsel defense at trial.
The Rise and Fall of Pharmalogical
William Scully and Rodi Lameh founded Pharmalogical, Inc,, planning to acquire pharmaceutical products from manufacturers and sell them to doctors, hospitals and clinics. Eventually, Scully set the company on the course of “parallel importing,” importing foreign versions of FDA-approved products into the United States from European distributors. The company purchased these drugs at reduced prices and sold them to customers in the United States at under-market prices. The product labels for the products did not contain a National Drug Code, so Scully and Lameh obtained an attorney opinion that Pharmalogical had no reason to believe it was in violation of any statute or regulation. This initially satisfied purchasers that Pharmalogical was authorized to sell. Later, when Pharmalogical was advised by the FDA that foreign-made versions of FDA-approved drugs were considered unapproved, it obtained a second legal opinion that the importation of the product would not violate United States criminal laws. After the FDA executed warrants to search Pharmalogical’s offices, Scully and Lameh each retained individual lawyers, and Pharmalogical ceased selling products.
Scully and Lameh were indicted for using Pharmalogical to import foreign versions of prescription drugs and medical devices for use in the United States. Lameh pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute misbranded drugs and cooperated with the government. Scully went to trial.
At trial, Scully introduced an advice-of-counsel defense, contending that he relied in good faith on the advice of attorneys concerning the legality of his conduct. Scully called the attorney who provided opinions to Pharmalogical on the legality of the sales. After the government effectively undermined the defense based on that testimony, Scully sought to testify himself that his individual attorney advised him the business was legal, rather than calling the second attorney to testify. EDNY Judge Arthur Spatt ruled that such testimony, while not hearsay as it went to state of mind, was inadmissible under the balancing inquiry of FRE 403, particularly where the second attorney was available to testify. The jury ultimately found Scully guilty. On appeal, Scully challenged the exclusion of evidence of his attorney’s legal advice and the jury instructions on the advice-of-counsel defense.
Evidence of Legal Advice
The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the evidence of Scully’s testimony as to his individual attorney’s legal advice under FRE 403. The statement was not hearsay as it was offered to prove the defendant’s state of mind and not for its truth. Moreover, the Second Circuit held that it was not appropriate to require Scully to call his attorney as a witness, as the government had ample means to challenge Scully’s testimony, including by cross-examining Scully or by calling the attorney as a rebuttal witness. The Court determined that Scully was not legally required to call his attorney, but was competent to testify about his own state of mind, and the question of his credibility should have been up to the jury. Scully was therefore entitled to a new trial.
Advice-Of-Counsel Jury Instruction
While Scully waived arguments concerning the jury instruction on advice-of-counsel, the Second Circuit provided guidance on the jury instruction as the case was being remanded for a new trial.
The Circuit noted that, in a fraud case, the advice-of-counsel defense is not an affirmative defense, but is instead evidence that, if believed, can raise a reasonable doubt on whether the government has proved the required element of the offense that the defendant had an “unlawful intent.” The jury instruction must therefore advise the jury that the government at all times bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the state of mind required for conviction. The district court should therefore not instruct the jury that the defendant “has the burden” of establishing the defense or must “satisfy” the elements of the defense. Instead, the Court referenced model jury instructions from Judge Leonard Sand and the Seventh Circuit, demonstrating that the defendant need not establish good faith, but that the government must carry its burden of proof to establish the intent element of the crime.