Corporate and Business

As New Yorkers are preparing for Thanksgiving and the official start to the holiday season (although some could argue it started a month ago), required Medicaid providers should also be reviewing their Compliance Programs in preparation to submit their Annual Provider Compliance Program Certification to the New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (“OMIG”).  Required providers must submit a certification at the time of their enrollment and each December thereafter.

As defined by Social Services Law Section 363-d (“Section 363-d”) and Part 521 of Title 18 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations (“Part 521”), required providers are considered any provider that can answer “Yes” to one of the following questions and therefore must implement a comprehensive Compliance Program:

  1. Is the provider organization subject to Article 28 or Article 36 of the NYS Public Health Law?
  2. Is the provider organization subject to Article 16 or Article 31 of the NYS Mental Hygiene Law?
  3. Does the provider organization claim or order, or can be reasonably expected to claim or order, Medicaid services or supplies of at least $500,000 in any consecutive 12-month period?
  4. Does the provider organization receive Medicaid payments, or can be reasonably expected to receive payments, either directly or indirectly, of at least $500,000 in any consecutive 12-month period?
  5. Does the provider organization submit Medicaid claims of at least $500,000 in any consecutive 12-month period on behalf of another person or persons?

There are two important concepts to be aware of when answering these questions.  First, as defined by the OMIG, Indirect Medicaid Reimbursement is any payment that a provider receives for the delivery of Medicaid care, services, or supplies that comes from a source other than the State of New York.  An example of this is when a provider provides covered services to a Medicaid beneficiary who is enrolled in a Medicaid Managed Care Plan, any payment from the Managed Care Organization is considered an indirect payment.

The second important concept is that the OMIG considers any consecutive 12-month period to be exactly that, any twelve consecutive months.  This determination should not be considered solely on a calendar year.  For example, if a provider established her practice on April 1, 2018 and will not reach $500,000 in either claims or payments by December 31, 2018 but can reasonably expect to hit that mark by March 2019, then that provider should have a Compliance Program in place and be prepared to certify to its implementation by December 31, 2018.

To assist providers, the OMIG’s website identifies seven compliance areas that a provider’s Compliance Program must apply to, as well as eight elements that should be included in all Compliance Programs, regardless of provider type.

The Seven Compliance Areas are:

  1. Billings;
  2. Payments;
  3. Medical necessity and quality of care;
  4. Governance;
  5. Mandatory reporting;
  6. Credentialing; and
  7. Other risk areas that are or should with due diligence be identified by the provider.

The Eight Elements required in every Compliance Program are:

Element 1: Establish written policies and procedures that clearly describe and implement compliance expectations, as well as provide guidance to employees and others on dealing with potential compliance issues.  The written policies and procedures must also identify how to communicate compliance issues to appropriate compliance personnel and describe how potential compliance problems are investigated and resolved.

Element 2: Designate a Compliance Officer who is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Compliance Program.

Element 3: Establish an effective training and education program for all affected employees and persons associated with the provider, including executives and governing body members (“affected persons”).

Element 4: Establish clear lines of communication to the Compliance Officer that allow all affected persons report compliance issues.  Providers must also establish anonymous and confidential reporting systems.

Element 5: Establish disciplinary policies that are fairly and firmly enforced to encourage good faith participation in the Compliance Program by all affected persons.  The policies must include clear expectations for the reporting or and assistance in resolving compliance issues.  The policies must also include defined sanctions for:

  • failing to report suspected problems;
  • participating in non-compliant behavior; or
  • encouraging, directing, facilitating or permitting either actively or passively non-compliant behavior.

Element 6: Conduct routine compliance assessments for those risk areas specific to the individual provider type, including but not limited to self-audits. These self-audits can be conducted internally or a provider may choose to have an external party conduct the audit.

Element 7: Establish a system for responding to and investigating potential compliance problems as the Compliance Officer becomes aware of them, either by a report received from an affected person or as the result of an internal assessment.  Compliance Program must also establish systems for the provider to report compliance issues the OMIG, as well as repay any related overpayments.

Element 8: Establish a policy of non-intimidation and non-retaliation for good faith participation in the Compliance Program, including but not limited to reporting potential issues, investigating issues, self-evaluations, audits and remedial actions, and reporting to appropriate officials as provided in sections 740 and 741 of the New York State Labor Law.

As mentioned above, each December, required providers must submit a Provider Compliance Program Certification, attesting that they have a Compliance Plan in place and that Compliance Plan satisfies each of the OMIG’s Eight Elements.  If a provider is unable to unequivocally state that their plan meets these requirements then a certification should not be submitted and immediate steps must be taken to all necessary modifications to establish a satisfactory Compliance Plan.  Any provider who submits a false certification may be subject to sanctions, including monetary fines or provider enrollment termination.

If you are unsure whether your Compliance Plan would satisfy the OMIG’s Eight Elements, or if you are a provider who believes you are required to implement a Compliance Plan and have not done so, please do not hesitate to contact Farrell Fritz’s Regulatory & Government Relations Practice Group at 518.313.1450 or NYSRGR@FarrellFritz.com.

Last week, in LeadingAge New York, Inc. v. Shah, the New York Court of Appeals addressed Department of Health regulations limiting executive compensation and administrative expenditures by healthcare providers receiving state funds. The Court upheld limits related to state funding, but struck down a limit that applied regardless of the source of funding.

In 2012, Governor Cuomo directed agencies providing state funding to service providers to regulate provider use of state funds for executive compensation and administrative costs. DOH responded with regulations restricting state-funded expenditures on administrative expenses and executive compensation for certain defined “covered providers.”

The regulations had two “hard caps,” one limiting administrative expenses to 15% of covered operating expenses paid with State funds, and one limiting the use of State funds for executive compensation to $199,000, absent a waiver. The regulations also had one “soft cap,” providing for penalties to a covered provider if executive compensation exceeded $199,000 from any source of funding, with specified exceptions concerning comparable provider compensation and board approval. Covered executives included those for whom salary and benefits were administrative expenses, and excluded clinical and program personnel.

Several petitioners challenged the regulations, including nursing homes, assisted-living programs, home-care agencies and trade associations.

The Court of Appeals grounded its decision in the separation of powers doctrine, which requires that “the Legislature make the critical policy decisions, while the executive branch’s responsibility is to implement those policies.” Chief Judge DiFiore looked to the Court’s prior decision in Boreali v. Axelrod for guidance in finding “the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making.”

The Court first reviewed the function of DOH, which manages state funds earmarked for public health, oversees the Medicaid program, and contracts with private entities. The Court said that DOH carries out these functions with the goal of ensuring that the limited public funding available be directed as efficiently as possible toward high-quality services.

The Court concluded that the hard cap regulations on both administrative expenses and executive compensation did not exceed DOH’s authority. The Legislature directed that DOH oversee the efficient expenditure of state health care funds. The hard caps are tied to the specific goal of efficiently directing state funds toward quality medical care for the public by limiting the extent to which state funds may be used for non-service-related salaries and disproportionately high administrative budgets. The Court found the hard cap regulations to be directly tied to the Legislative policy goal without subverting it in favor of unrelated public policy interests.

In contrast, the Court struck down the soft cap regulation, which restricted executive compensation over $199,000 regardless of funding source, because it represented “an unauthorized excursion by DOH beyond the parameters set by the Legislature.” The Court found that while the hard cap regulations capped the use of public funding, the soft cap imposed an overall cap on executive compensation, regardless of the funding source. “The soft cap thus pursues a policy consideration – limited executive compensation – that is not clearly connected to the objectives outlined by the Legislature but represents a distinct ‘value judgment.’” The soft cap restriction on executive compensation was not “sufficiently tethered” to the enabling legislation which largely concerned state funding. The Court concluded that the soft cap regulation exceeded DOH’s administrative authority as it envisioned the additional goal of limiting executive compensation as a matter of public policy.

All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that the hard cap on administrative expenditures was permissible, but the dissenting Judges differed on executive compensation.  Judge Garcia would have stricken both hard and soft caps on executive compensation, because they represented a “policy choice about reasonable compensation aimed at influencing corporate behavior,” which is “law-making beyond DOH’s regulatory authority.”  In contrast, Judge Wilson would had found both limits to be permissible.  He criticized the majority’s reliance on Boreali, and saw the proper analysis to be whether the regulation exceeded the executive power.  He would have used that rationale to uphold the hard cap on executive compensation, and also would have found the soft cap permissible because it advance the statutory goals of preventing providers from circumventing the hard cap and advising providers the State may allocate taxpayer funds away from undesireable or inefficient vendors and toward competitors who provide superior value.

At least where State funds are at issue, LeadingAge provides the Governor and executive agencies with broad authority to police and restrict the use of State funding.

New York State Court of Appeals, Albany, New York

Earlier this Summer, the Court of Appeals overturned the Appellate Division Third Department’s (the “Third Department”) unanimous decision in The Matter of Anonymous v. Molik, where it ruled that the New York State Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs (“Justice Center”) exceeded its authority by substantiating a report against a facility or provider agency based upon a “concurrent finding” of neglect.[i]  With its decision, the Court of Appeals has not only clarified the Justice Center’s scope of authority, but also reopened the floodgates to a large number of investigations and appeals that have been existing in a state of limbo since the Third Department’s June 2, 2016 decision.[ii]

Pursuant to Executive Law §§ 551-562 and Social Services Law §§ 488-497, the Justice Center was established in 2013 to protect “vulnerable persons who receive care from New York State’s human services agencies.”[iii] It was created to protect all vulnerable persons, or those “who, due to physical or cognitive disabilities, or the need for services or placement, [are] receiving services from a facility or provider agency.”[iv]

All reportable incidents, including any allegation of neglect,[v] must be reported by a facility to the Statewide Vulnerable Persons’ Central Register (“VPCR”)[vi], whereby the Justice Center is mandated to investigate the allegation(s) and submit its findings to the VPCR.[vii]  The Justice Center’s findings are “based on a preponderance of the evidence and indicate whether the alleged abuse or neglect is substantiated in that it is determined the incident occurred and the subject of the report, facility or provider agency are responsible; or the allegation is found to be unsubstantiated because the event did not occur, or the subject of the report was found not responsible.”[viii] Additionally, the Justice Center may make “a concurrent finding . . . that a systemic problem [at the provider agency or facility] caused or contributed to the occurrence of the incident.”[ix]

In Molik, a male resident engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with a female resident after two staff members momentarily left a common room at the Petitioner’s facility.[x] This assault was the third incident in a six month period, with the previous two assaults being known to the Petitioner.[xi]  The Justice Center investigated the incident, but did not substantiate a report of neglect against the two individuals because “there were no policies or requirements in place prohibiting staff from leaving the room unattended while residents were gathered there.”[xii] However, since the male resident had previously engaged in similar conduct, the Justice Center substantiated a concurrent finding of neglect against the Petitioner, the operator of the residential facility, “for failing to implement clear staff supervision protocols and for failing to modify [the male resident’s] care plan to increase his level of supervision after the first two attacks.”[xiii]

The Petitioner requested that the Justice Center amend its finding to unsubstantiated, which was denied, leading to the Petitioner’s Article 78 action where it received unanimous support from the Third Department.[xiv]  In its decision, the Third Department overturned the Justice Center’s concurrent finding, stating that it did not have to “defer to the Justice Center’s interpretation of the statutory provisions in question . . . [but rather defer to the] pure statutory interpretation dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent.”[xv] “[T]he only circumstance under which the Justice Center could substantiate a report of neglect against a facility or provider agency is where an incident of neglect has occurred but the subject cannot be identified — a situation that is plainly not present here.”[xvi] The Third Department continued by saying, while the Justice Center does, in fact, have the authority to make a concurrent finding, “the only concurrent finding that may be made is that a systemic problem caused or contributed to the occurrence of the incident.”[xvii] Accordingly, since the controlling statute did not provide the Justice Center with the clear ability to categorize a concurrent finding it necessarily followed that such a finding could not constitute neglect on the part of a provider agency.[xviii]

The Court of Appeals, however, did not share in the Third Department’s view, stating that courts may look beyond the literal text of a statute when “the plain intent and purpose of the statute would otherwise be defeated.”[xix] Consequently, the Court viewed the Petitioner’s, and the Third Department’s, narrow interpretation of the law as “leav[ing] the Justice Center powerless to address many systemic issues, defeating the purpose of the Act and preventing the Justice Center from protecting vulnerable persons where it is most critical to do so.”[xx]  The Court, in light of the particular underlying events in Molik, ruled that to uphold this construction “would perversely allow this dangerous cycle to continue: employee conduct could not be substantiated because it does not violate facility policies, but facility policies would remain ineffective because the Justice Center lacks authority to implement change.”[xxi]

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rivera stated that she agreed with the majority that “[i]t would lead to absurd results if [N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 493(3)(a) were interpreted] to permit a facility or provider agency to be found responsible in those situations where an incident occurs and no subject can be identified, but not where an identified subject is found not responsible for a confirmed incident of abuse or neglect.”[xxii]  However, Judge Rivera points out that a ‘concurrent’ finding should be viewed as an ‘adjunct’, requiring that an initial finding of neglect must be made before a provider agency could be found to have concurrently committed neglect, even if the initial subject is ultimately found not responsible.[xxiii]  In Molik, as reasoned by Judge Rivera, the initial step of establishing a finding of abuse or neglect was never reached because the allegation of neglect against the two identified subjects was declared unsubstantiated; therefore, a ‘concurrent’ finding could not be made.[xxiv]

In a post-Molik world, it is imperative that all provider agencies subject to Justice Center oversight review their internal policies, procedures, and processes, understanding that they too are now clearly within the Justice Center’s reach.  Provider agencies should evaluate previous incidents that occurred within the facility to determine whether the necessary corrective actions have been taken or if further steps are needed.  Furthermore, staff training curriculum should be reevaluated to determine whether opportunities for improvement exist.

If you have any questions or would like additional information regarding the Justice Center, or would be interested in assistance reviewing, developing or revising your policies, processes, and training programs, please do not hesitate to contact Farrell Fritz’s Regulatory & Government Relations Practice Group at 518.313.1450 or NYSRGR@FarrellFritz.com

————————————————————————————————————————

[i] Anonymous v. Molik, 2018 WL 3147607 (N.Y. Jun. 28, 2018).

[ii] Matter of Anonymous v. Molik, 141 A.D.3d 162, (App. Div. 3 Dep’t, June 2, 2016)

[iii] 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 700.1(a).

[iv] N.Y. Soc. Servs. Law § 488(14).

[v] 14 N.Y.C.R.R § 624.3(b)(8).

[vi] N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 492(1)(a).

[vii] Id. at (3)(c)(i); Id. at (3)(c)(viii); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 493(1).

[viii] N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 492(3)(a).

[ix] Id. at (3)(b).

[x] Molik, 2018 WL 3147607 at *1.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] Id. at *2.

[xv] Molik, 141 A.D.3d. at 166 (internal citations omitted).

[xvi] Id. at 167 (citing N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 492(3)(a)).

[xvii] Id. at 167–168 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[xviii] Id.

[xix] Id. at *4.

[xx] Molik, 2018 WL 3147607 at *5.

[xxi] Id.

[xxii] Id. at 8

[xxiii] Id. at 9.

[xxiv] Id. at 10.

 

Just over one year ago, I wrote about the Department of Health and Human Service’s (“HHS”) $105 million award to support 1,333 federally qualified health centers (“Health Centers”) across the United States improve the quality of comprehensive care provided to patients. It seems like déjà vu, as it was announced last month that HHS set aside $125 million in quality improvement grants to be allocated among 1,352 Health Centers. A list of recipients can be found here.

Health Centers receive funding through the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), a branch of the federal government with a primary purpose of delivering comprehensive healthcare to patients who cannot otherwise afford such care. Treatments offered at Health Centers, include, without limitation, physician services, homebound visits by nurses in geographic locations where home health agencies are sparse, and clinical psychology services. The overarching goals set by HRSA with respect to Health Centers are to:

  • Make available high quality healthcare treatments and ancillary services, including education and transportation to facilities;
  • Offer care at affordable rates and charge patients in accordance with a practical scale;
  • Have community stakeholders serve on the governing boards to communicate the specific needs of the locality; and
  • Create a patient-centered foundation to address the diverse needs of the medically underserved.

In accordance with those goals, the grants are designed to improve Health Centers. Specifically, the funds will be used for “[e]xpanding access to comprehensive care, improving care quality and outcomes, increasing comprehensive care delivery in a cost-effective way, addressing health disparities, advancing the use of health information technology, and delivering patient-centered care.”

Speaking on the new grants and reflecting on the preceding year, HRSA Administrator George Sigounas, MS, Ph.D., said “[n]early all HRSA-funded health centers demonstrated improvement in one or more clinical quality measures from the year prior, and these funds will support health centers’ work to improve the quality of care they deliver in their communities around the country.”

As healthcare costs continue to rise in many parts of the country, eligible patients have an alternative route to obtain affordable healthcare without the burdens associated with visiting the local hospital. Health Centers are a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy healthcare system.

 

 

 

 

 

 

This post is written in connection with my colleague Vanessa Bongiorno’s recent post, where she eloquently summarized the New York Department of Health’s (“DOH”) findings of the multi-agency study on the impact of regulated adult-use marijuana in New York.

In the report, DOH found that even though marijuana use does contain risks, there are benefits associated with implementing a regulated adult-use marijuana program, including positive impacts on New York’s criminal justice system and an alternative to opioid use, which has long impacted so many New Yorkers and their families. The DOH report concluded with, among other things, a recommendation that New York establishes a workgroup of subject matter professionals with relevant public health experience to debate the details of a regulated marijuana program and offer solutions consistent with reducing harm and educating the public.

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo accepted the recommendation and recently announced the creation of a workgroup to help draft legislation for regulated adult-use marijuana, which will be overseen by Alphonso David, an advisor to the Governor. The workgroup consists of professors of major New York educational institutions, law enforcement representatives, governmental stakeholders, and mental health experts, to name a few. A full list of workgroup members can be found here.

Speaking on the development, Governor Cuomo stated “[t]he next steps must be taken thoughtfully and deliberately. As we work to implement the report’s recommendation through legislation, we must thoroughly consider all aspects of a regulated marijuana program, including its impact on public health, criminal justice and State revenue, and mitigate any potential risks associated with it.”

It is abundantly clear that New York is serious about adopting a regulated marijuana program. While the details of such program are beginning to be hashed out, New York’s long anticipated debate over regulated adult-use marijuana appears to be coming to a resolution.

 

Unlike most other types of employment arrangements involving physicians, physicians acting as a medical director are compensated purely for the performance of administrative services related to patient care services. That is not to say that a medical director does not play a crucial role in the operation of a health care provider. In fact, the New York State Department of Health recommends, or even requires, medical directors be put in place for certain types of providers, and federal law similarly requires medical directors for certain types of services and facilities.

 

Because medical directors are not performing medical services, many physicians feel comfortable entering into medical directorship with little or no written documentation. However, physicians should proceed with caution when undertaking a medical director role. In particular, medical director arrangements are often scrutinized by the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to determine whether the arrangement is, in reality, being used as a vehicle to provide remuneration to physicians for patient referrals. For this reason, where the contracting provider participates with federal payors and the physician may refer patients to the contracting provider, the physician should enter into a written medical director agreement that is structured to fall within an exception (or safe harbor) to the federal Stark and anti-kickback statutes.

Most often, the exception used under both Stark and anti-kickback laws will be the “personal services” safe harbor. Although slightly different under each statute, some key elements in complying with the “personal services” safe harbor are as follows:

 

  • Written Agreement: The agreement between the physician and the provider should be in writing, with a term of not less than one year. [1]
  • Duties: The agreement should provide for all of the services which the physician is expected to perform.[2]
  • Commercially Reasonable: The services provided by the medical director should be necessary to the provider and not exceed the amount of services required by the provider. This analysis is focused not only on whether the contracting physician’s services in and of themselves are necessary, but also whether there are other medical directors and whether numerous medical directors are performing duplicative services.[3]
  • Compensation: [4]
    • Fair Market Value – The physician should be paid fair market value for the services provided. To this end, it might be helpful to obtain a fair market value analysis, taking into account the geographic location, the experience of the physician, the certification of the physician, and they type of facility. While having such an analysis is not an absolute defense in an investigation, it is useful to demonstrate that fair market value was analyzed and that the remuneration falls within what was believed to be an acceptable range.
    • Hourly Rate – It is recommended that the medical director be paid on an hourly basis, with such hourly rate being paid at the fair market value rate.
    • Cap on Compensation – it is also recommended that the aggregate compensation a physician can earn for his documented hours be capped, to further ensure reasonableness.[5]
  • Documentation: The physician should keep daily time logs of services performed and the time spent on each service. This shows that the physician is performing real work, for which he or she is being paid fair market value, and also can be used to demonstrate that the services being performed are necessary for the facility.

While it is always best to consult with an experienced professional before entering into medical director arrangement, adhering to the criteria set forth above can offer protection for both the physician and the facility.

[1] 42 CFR 1001.952(d)(1): “The agency agreement is set out in writing and signed by the parties.” 42 CFR 1001.952(d)(4): “The term of the agreement is for not less than one year.” 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(3)(A)(i): “the arrangement is set out in writing, signed by the parties, and specifies the services covered by the arrangement.” 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(3)(A)(iv): “the term of the arrangement is for at least 1 year.”

[2] 42 CFR 1001.952(d)(2): “The agency agreement covers all of the services the agent provides to the principal for the term of the agreement and specifies the services to be provided by the agent.” 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(3)(A)(ii): “the arrangement covers all of the services to be provided by the physician.”

[3] 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(3)(A)(iii): “the aggregate services contracted for do not exceed those that are reasonable and necessary for the legitimate business purposes of the arrangement.”

[4] 42 CFR 1001.952(d)(5): “The aggregate compensation paid to the agent over the term of the agreement is set in advance, is consistent with fair market value in arms-length transactions and is not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs.” 42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)(3)(A)(v): “the compensation to be paid over the term of the arrangement is set in advance, does not exceed fair market value, and . . . is not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals of other business generated between the parties.”

[5] In OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-17 (2001), the OIG said that even though total aggregate compensation over the contract has not be set in advance, the totality of facts and circumstances in the specific circumstances at hand yield a conclusion that there is no significant increase in risk of fraud and abuse – however, this finding was likely due to the presence of a monthly payment cap. In 2003, in Advisory Opinion 03-8, the OIG found that a proposed arrangement does not qualify for protection under the safe harbor because the aggregate compensation paid under a management agreement would not be set in advance.

In a decision last week that could affect $12 billion that insurers assert is owed by the federal government, the Federal Circuit decided that HHS was not required to pay amounts required by statute because Congress had repealed or suspended those obligations through riders to appropriations bills. In Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit rejected one insurer’s claim that it was statutorily and contractually owed close to $210 million under the government risk corridors program.

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) established health benefit exchanges in each state for individuals and small groups to purchase health coverage. Insurers, however, faced significant risk if they offered plans in the exchange, because they lacked reliable data to estimate the cost of providing care for an expanding pool of individuals seeking coverage. To mitigate that risk and discourage insurers from setting higher premiums to offset that risk, the ACA established the risk corridors program.

Under the risk corridors program, participating plans whose costs of coverage exceeded the premiums received would be paid a share of their excess costs by HHS (“payments out”), and plans whose premiums exceeded their costs would pay to HHS a share of their profits (“payments in”). HHS promulgated regulations providing that health plans would receive payments in from HHS or make payments out to HHS in the formulas set forth in the statute. Congress, however, provided in riders to appropriations bills that none of the funds appropriated for HHS in fiscal years 2015 through 2017 could be used for payments under the risk corridors program. The Congressional purpose was to make the risk corridor program budget neutral, so that HHS would not pay out more than it collected under the program. CMS reported that in the three year period of 2014-2016, payments in to HHS fell short of payments out by more than $12 billion. For that reason, HHS paid only prorated portions of the payments out to insurers.

Moda Health Plans sued under the Tucker Act, seeking almost $210 million, constituting the unpaid amounts it claimed it was owed under the risk corridors program under the ACA. Moda argued that the ACA itself obligated HHS to pay insurers the full amount under the risk corridors program, regardless of the amount of payments in, and that HHS breached its contractual agreement to pay the full amount required by the statute. The Federal Circuit rejected both arguments.

The Court agreed with Moda that the ACA obligated the government to pay the full amount of the risk corridors payments, but held that the Congressional appropriations riders effected a suspension of that obligation for each of the relevant years. The Court first held that the statute was mandatory with respect to payments out, and could not be read to require such payments to be budget neutral. Thus, the plain language of the statute created an obligation of the government to pay the full amount for payments out under the risk corridors program.

The Court held, however, that through HHS appropriations riders, Congress repealed or suspended the obligation to make any payments out if they exceeded payments in. Repeals by implication are generally disfavored, but the Court held that the appropriations riders adequately expressed Congress’s intent to suspend payments on the risk corridors program beyond the sum of payments in. Congress clearly indicated its intent to limit the funding of payments out to payments in, thus requiring the risk corridors program to be budget neutral. As a result, no taxpayer funds would be used for the risk corridors payments, and the government would not pay out more than it collected from insurers under the program.

The Federal Circuit also rejected Moda’s claim for HHS’s breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Absent clear indication, legislation and regulation cannot establish the government’s intent to bind itself in a contract. The Court held that the overall scheme of the risk corridors program lacked the trappings of a contractual arrangement.

The Moda Health Plan decision may affect billions of dollars that insurers claim they are owed by the federal government. The Supreme Court may be the next stop for the risk corridors program issues decide by the Federal Circuit, and the Justices may have yet another chance to examine the Affordable Care Act and Congressional intent.

 

Earlier this month the New York State Department of Health released the first results of its recently adopted Medicaid redesign efforts, the Delivery System Reform Incentive Payment (“DSRIP”), in four core areas: (1) metric performance, (2) success of projects, (3) total Medicaid spending and (4) managed care expenditures.   The passing scores stem from the collaborative efforts of the Performing Provider Systems comprised of New York hospitals, providers and other key stakeholders.

In April 2014, New York State and the federal government agreed to a DSRIP framework, pumping approximately $8 billion in state health care savings to target Medicaid reforms. The goal of the DSRIP waiver is to reduce patient hospital usage by 25% over 5 years while improving patient-centered care. The program includes $6.42 billion for DSRIP Planning Grants, Provider Incentive Payments, and administrative costs.

The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services did find, however, that New York still needs to show improvement in certain areas, including preventable hospital readmissions and emergency room visits as well as access to timely appointments.

Speaking on the results, Donna Frescatore, the New York State Medicaid Director, said “[a] passing grade on all four of the milestones proves that we are making monumental progress toward improving care for millions of New Yorkers….While we are on a clear path to success, our work is far from over. In the months and years ahead, we will shift our focus toward improving performance metrics and health outcomes as we work to change the culture of health care.”

Even though New York received passing scores on its first report card, the state must continue to demonstrate improvement going forward to avoid financial penalties associated with failing to meet the requisite benchmarks.  It will be interesting to see if New York meets the 25% hospital usage reduction by March 31, 2020, the date the DSRIP waiver ends.

The full report can be found here.

As we have discussed in an earlier blog post, the federal administrative agencies have been placing greater emphasis on being more transparent and promoting “interoperability”.

As such, on April 24, 2018, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) proposed changes to its Inpatient Prospective Payment System and Long-Term Care Hospital Prospective Payment System to promote better access to patient electronic health information and increase pricing transparency. For example, while hospitals are already required to make pricing information publicly available, the proposed rules impose more stringent guidelines, including a requirement that hospitals post pricing information on the internet. Seema Verma, the CMS Administrator, stated “[t]oday’s proposed rule demonstrates our commitment to patient access to high quality care while removing outdated and redundant regulations on providers. We envision a system that rewards value over volume and where patients reap the benefits through more choices and better outcomes.”

Critical to the proposed changes is a complete overhaul of the Medicare and Medicaid Electronic Health Records Incentive Programs, which is commonly known as the “Meaningful Use” program, by executing on the following core principles:

  1. Having a program that is more flexible and less burdensome;
  2. Placing greater emphasis and encouraging the exchange of health information between providers and patients; and
  3. Incentivizing providers to streamline the process for patients to be able to access their medical records electronically.

A rebranding would not be complete without, of course, a name change; in fact, CMS has proposed changing the “Meaningful Use” program to “Promoting Interoperability”. Interoperability, which means “the ability of computer systems or software to exchange and make use of information,” has been missing from the healthcare industry as technology has been advancing at an unprecedented rate. In a system where healthcare is central to our lives, it appears the final goal is to have a system where patients could have access to a virtual portal where all of their health information from various providers would be available, thus promoting patient-centered care where providers have greater insight into their patient’s medical history—invariably resulting in more thoughtful care. It is refreshing to see government, which is commonly known to always be a step behind private industry, taking the initiative to modernize its infrastructure. At this point in history a patient should be able to obtain his health information on a whim via his mobile device or even see a new physician while not having to deal with the administrative nightmares associated therewith.

While it is unclear if the final goal of “interoperability” will be reached, CMS’ proposed changes are definitely an encouraging step forward.

For more information, please see the CMS fact sheet.

 

 

New York’s FY 2019 Executive Budget includes new legislation aimed at combatting sexual harassment in the workplace.  According to the Governor, the legislation purports to be the “most comprehensive anti-sexual harassment protections in the nation….”  Here are the highlights:

  • Effective Immediately:  The new legislation prohibits sexual harassment of “non-employees in the employer’s workplace,” including “contractors, subcontractors, vendors, consultants or other persons providing services pursuant to a contract in the workplace or who is an employee of such contractor, subcontractor, vendor, consultant or other person providing services pursuant to a contract in the workplace. July 11, 2018:  Any settlement, agreement or other resolution directly relating to sexual harassment claims may not include language that prevents the disclosure of the underlying facts unless the plaintiff (1) has been given 21 days to consider the confidentiality/non-disclosure provision and 7 days to revoke the agreement after signing.
  • Effective July 11, 2018:  Mandatory arbitration agreements with respect to sexual harassment claims will no longer be enforceable and shall be deemed null and void.  Worth noting, mandatory arbitration agreements that include sexual harassment disputes remain enforceable with respect to all other claims.
  • Effective October 9, 2018:  Employers must establish a sexual harassment prevention policy and conduct annual interactive sexual harassment training.  The Department of Labor has been charged with consulting with the Division of Human Rights and producing a model training program.  The new rules also mandate written sexual harassment policies that include a standard complaint form, examples of prohibited conduct, and a procedure for timely investigations.

Going Forward . . . Watch for information on the Department of Labor’s model sexual harassment prevention policy and training program as well as Farrell Fritz’s Master Class for those responsible for sexual harassment training initiatives!

If you have questions concerning the development or implementation of these new employer obligations, contact Domenique Camacho Moran, Farrell Fritz’s Labor and Employment Practice Group at 516.227.0626 or dmoran@FarrellFritz.com.