Hospitals and Health Care Facilities

bankruptcy lawSection 351 of the Bankruptcy Code permits a health care business in bankruptcy to dispose of patient records if it lacks sufficient funds to pay to store the records in accord with applicable state or federal law.  Although section 351 was enacted in 2005, the provision appears to be little used.  That’s because the procedures required before patient records may be destroyed are time consuming, onerous and, in all likelihood, more expensive than storing them.

If the health care business in bankruptcy has insufficient funds to pay for patient records storage under applicable law, section 351 requires that it promptly publish notice in one or more appropriate newspapers that patient records not claimed by patients or insurers within one year will be destroyed.  Within six months after the publication, it must notify each patient by mail at the patient’s most recent known address, or the address of a family member or contact person for the patient, to claim his/her records within the one-year period.   The insurer for each patient must also receive notice by mail to claim the records or suffer their destruction.  For any patient records not claimed within the one-year period, the debtor health care business must send written requests to each “appropriate” federal agency asking permission to deposit the unclaimed records with the agency.  Whatever patient records remain in the possession of the health care business following this procedure must be shredded or burned, if they are written records, or destroyed, if magnetic, optical or electronic.  Bankruptcy Rule 6011 provides further guidance that the notice must be sent to patients and family members or contact persons for patients, and the Attorney General of the state where the health care facility is located.

In addition to being time consuming and somewhat vague, these requirements would be onerous for all with the possible exception of health care businesses with few patients.  A large physician practice group will have thousands or tens of thousands of patient records, many of which may be written.  The administrative effort to review each of them for patient addresses, family members and others such as health care proxies, and prepare and send the notices, will likely be time consuming, expensive and difficult.  A hospital will likely have tens or hundreds of thousands of patient records. The time, effort and expense needed to comply with section 351 for a hospital of any size would be herculean.

A number of hospitals which have filed chapter 11, ceased operations and confirmed plans of liquidation without a going concern sale of their business or assets in which the buyer that acquired the patient records, found an easier, much faster and more inexpensive alternative to section 351.  The buyer paid a records storage company to take all of the patient records.  The records storage company took possession of the records, converted paper records to electronic form, maintained them pursuant to applicable state and federal law, culled out and destroyed old records when state and federal law permitted, and, for a fee, provided access to the records to patients and litigation parties, in actions and proceedings where the records were relevant.  In this writer’s experience, there have often been several records storage companies willing to store and maintain the records and the debtor hospital has been able to obtain competing bids from them.  These hospitals had sufficient funds to pay a records storage company to take and administer the patient records.  Query whether they had sufficient funds to comply with section 351.

Debtor health care businesses that are insolvent on a post-bankruptcy basis, and intend to or are forced to shut down their operations and liquidate without a confirmed plan or in chapter 7, might consider disposing of patient records under section 351.  Except possibly for small businesses, however, the time, effort and expense of following the procedure mandated by section 351 will likely be much greater than the records-storage- company alternative, so long as this alternative is available.  Although it is not clear how such insolvent health care businesses would pay for records disposal under section 351 or, alternatively, pay to transfer the records to a records storage company, the latter will likely be less time consuming, take much less administrative effort and be less expensive.

Since the advent of the Medicaid managed care program there has been a lingering question as to when a Medicaid dollar stopped being a Medicaid dollar.

With fee-for-service providers that were paid directly by the Medicaid program, the answer was always clear-cut – each dollar received from the Medicaid program was a Medicaid dollar and therefore it and the provider who received it were subject to the audit authority of the New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (“OMIG”).

But what about providers contracted through Medicaid managed care organizations (“MCO”) and not directly enrolled as Medicaid providers? Before Governor Cuomo issued his Executive Budget earlier this month, there was debate as to where the OMIG’s audit authority stopped with arguments on either side of the line.  Many argued that the OMIG’s authority stopped with at the doors of the MCO.  After the money was paid to the MCO it was able to negotiate contracts directly with providers and disburse the funds as it saw fit, with each MCO operating independently of each other.  The other side of the coin was that a dollar spent with the purpose of providing care to a Medicaid recipient established that the dollar was a Medicaid dollar from start to finish, regardless of whether it was passed through a MCO.

With the Executive Budget, however, all confusion and debate will be settled.  Per the proposed language of the Health and Mental Hygiene Article VII Legislation, Social Services Law Section 364-j will be amended to state that “[a]ny payment made pursuant to the state’s managed care program, including payments made by managed long term care plans, shall be deemed a payment by the state’s medical assistance program.”

The Executive Budget goes further, clearly defining the OMIG’s ability to recover overpayments made by a MCO to its contracted providers that were discovered during an OMIG audit or investigation, as well as during an investigation or prosecution by the New York State Office of the Attorney General Medicaid Fraud Control Unit (“MFCU”).  If the OMIG is unable to recover the overpayment, the MCO may be required to act on the OMIG’s behalf to recoup the overpaid funds and repay the State within six months of receiving notice of the overpayment.

The legislation sets January 1, 2018 as the start of the review period and, without any amendments to the budget bill by the Legislature, will go into effect immediately upon the Governor signing the bills into law.  With the OMIG poised to begin these audits, MCO-contracted providers should familiarize themselves with the OMIG’s audit protocols and procedures.

Medicaid providers, both fee-for-service and those contracted with MCO, who are interested in taking a proactive stance in preparing for an OMIG or MFCU audit or investigation, or providers who are already the subject of one are encouraged to contact Farrell Fritz’s Regulatory & Government Relations Practice Group at 518.313.1450 or NYSRGR@FarrellFritz.com to plan your next move.

In federal criminal investigations, corporate health care providers have faced a Department of Justice increasingly focused on individuals, one that has limited or foreclosed cooperation credit for corporations not providing complete information on all individual involvement. At a conference in late November, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein outlined a modification of these stringent guidelines, to some extent for criminal prosecutions cases but more significantly for civil cases.

The 2015 Yates Memorandum established DOJ’s policy on individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing. This policy provided that corporations must provide all relevant facts about individuals to be eligible for any cooperation credit; criminal and civil investigations should focus on individuals from inception; no corporate resolution will provide protection from criminal or civil liability for any individuals; and considerations for civil suits against individuals should go beyond ability to pay, stressing deterrence and accountability.

Rosenstein first highlighted the consistencies of the new approach with the Yates Memorandum, as pursuing individuals responsible for wrongdoing is still a top DOJ priority. Any company seeking cooperation credit must identify all individuals substantially involved in or responsible for the criminal conduct. However, “investigations should not be delayed merely to collect information about individuals whose involvement was not substantial, and who are not likely to be prosecuted.” In criminal cases, this will allow cooperation credit without identifying every person involved, as long as the company discloses individuals who played significant roles or who authorized the misconduct.

Rosenstein said the changes were driven in large part by DOJ’s affirmative civil enforcement cases, where the changes are more substantial. The primary goal of these cases is to recover money, and DOJ found the Yates Memorandum’s “all or nothing” approach to cooperation counterproductive in civil cases. “When criminal liability is not at issue, our attorneys need flexibility to accept settlements that remedy the harm and deter future violations, so they can move on to other cases. … Our civil litigators simply cannot take the time to pursue civil cases against every individual employee who may be liable for misconduct.”

The new policy gives DOJ civil attorneys the discretion to offer some credit even if a company does not qualify for the maximum credit that comes with identifying every individual substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct, as long as the company meaningfully assists the government’s investigation and does not conceal wrongdoing. DOJ civil lawyers can negotiate civil releases for individuals who do not warrant additional investigation and, importantly, can consider an individual’s ability to pay in deciding whether to pursue a civil judgment. Rosenstein said these “commonsense reforms” would return to DOJ civil attorneys the discretion they previously exercised in civil cases, to “use their resources most efficiently to achieve their enforcement mission.”

The practical implications of this change will play out over time. Rosenstein’s language suggests that a significant dividing line will be whether individual U.S. Attorney’s Offices view the conduct at issue as a joint criminal-civil matter or as a civil matter without a parallel criminal case. In the former, the only change may be an understanding that the company may be able to streamline the number of people that are the focus of investigation and disclosure. In a purely civil investigation or case, however, Rosenstein’s language indicates significant discretion will be given to DOJ civil attorneys to work out practical settlements that aim towards monetary recoveries for the government and victims, as well as an efficient use of resources to maximize recovery across all cases. In at least the purely civil cases, Rosenstein’s comments offer significant arguments to defense counsel to propose and advocate the practical resolution of government investigations and cases.

As New Yorkers are preparing for Thanksgiving and the official start to the holiday season (although some could argue it started a month ago), required Medicaid providers should also be reviewing their Compliance Programs in preparation to submit their Annual Provider Compliance Program Certification to the New York State Office of the Medicaid Inspector General (“OMIG”).  Required providers must submit a certification at the time of their enrollment and each December thereafter.

As defined by Social Services Law Section 363-d (“Section 363-d”) and Part 521 of Title 18 of the New York Code of Rules and Regulations (“Part 521”), required providers are considered any provider that can answer “Yes” to one of the following questions and therefore must implement a comprehensive Compliance Program:

  1. Is the provider organization subject to Article 28 or Article 36 of the NYS Public Health Law?
  2. Is the provider organization subject to Article 16 or Article 31 of the NYS Mental Hygiene Law?
  3. Does the provider organization claim or order, or can be reasonably expected to claim or order, Medicaid services or supplies of at least $500,000 in any consecutive 12-month period?
  4. Does the provider organization receive Medicaid payments, or can be reasonably expected to receive payments, either directly or indirectly, of at least $500,000 in any consecutive 12-month period?
  5. Does the provider organization submit Medicaid claims of at least $500,000 in any consecutive 12-month period on behalf of another person or persons?

There are two important concepts to be aware of when answering these questions.  First, as defined by the OMIG, Indirect Medicaid Reimbursement is any payment that a provider receives for the delivery of Medicaid care, services, or supplies that comes from a source other than the State of New York.  An example of this is when a provider provides covered services to a Medicaid beneficiary who is enrolled in a Medicaid Managed Care Plan, any payment from the Managed Care Organization is considered an indirect payment.

The second important concept is that the OMIG considers any consecutive 12-month period to be exactly that, any twelve consecutive months.  This determination should not be considered solely on a calendar year.  For example, if a provider established her practice on April 1, 2018 and will not reach $500,000 in either claims or payments by December 31, 2018 but can reasonably expect to hit that mark by March 2019, then that provider should have a Compliance Program in place and be prepared to certify to its implementation by December 31, 2018.

To assist providers, the OMIG’s website identifies seven compliance areas that a provider’s Compliance Program must apply to, as well as eight elements that should be included in all Compliance Programs, regardless of provider type.

The Seven Compliance Areas are:

  1. Billings;
  2. Payments;
  3. Medical necessity and quality of care;
  4. Governance;
  5. Mandatory reporting;
  6. Credentialing; and
  7. Other risk areas that are or should with due diligence be identified by the provider.

The Eight Elements required in every Compliance Program are:

Element 1: Establish written policies and procedures that clearly describe and implement compliance expectations, as well as provide guidance to employees and others on dealing with potential compliance issues.  The written policies and procedures must also identify how to communicate compliance issues to appropriate compliance personnel and describe how potential compliance problems are investigated and resolved.

Element 2: Designate a Compliance Officer who is responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Compliance Program.

Element 3: Establish an effective training and education program for all affected employees and persons associated with the provider, including executives and governing body members (“affected persons”).

Element 4: Establish clear lines of communication to the Compliance Officer that allow all affected persons report compliance issues.  Providers must also establish anonymous and confidential reporting systems.

Element 5: Establish disciplinary policies that are fairly and firmly enforced to encourage good faith participation in the Compliance Program by all affected persons.  The policies must include clear expectations for the reporting or and assistance in resolving compliance issues.  The policies must also include defined sanctions for:

  • failing to report suspected problems;
  • participating in non-compliant behavior; or
  • encouraging, directing, facilitating or permitting either actively or passively non-compliant behavior.

Element 6: Conduct routine compliance assessments for those risk areas specific to the individual provider type, including but not limited to self-audits. These self-audits can be conducted internally or a provider may choose to have an external party conduct the audit.

Element 7: Establish a system for responding to and investigating potential compliance problems as the Compliance Officer becomes aware of them, either by a report received from an affected person or as the result of an internal assessment.  Compliance Program must also establish systems for the provider to report compliance issues the OMIG, as well as repay any related overpayments.

Element 8: Establish a policy of non-intimidation and non-retaliation for good faith participation in the Compliance Program, including but not limited to reporting potential issues, investigating issues, self-evaluations, audits and remedial actions, and reporting to appropriate officials as provided in sections 740 and 741 of the New York State Labor Law.

As mentioned above, each December, required providers must submit a Provider Compliance Program Certification, attesting that they have a Compliance Plan in place and that Compliance Plan satisfies each of the OMIG’s Eight Elements.  If a provider is unable to unequivocally state that their plan meets these requirements then a certification should not be submitted and immediate steps must be taken to all necessary modifications to establish a satisfactory Compliance Plan.  Any provider who submits a false certification may be subject to sanctions, including monetary fines or provider enrollment termination.

If you are unsure whether your Compliance Plan would satisfy the OMIG’s Eight Elements, or if you are a provider who believes you are required to implement a Compliance Plan and have not done so, please do not hesitate to contact Farrell Fritz’s Regulatory & Government Relations Practice Group at 518.313.1450 or NYSRGR@FarrellFritz.com.

Last week, in LeadingAge New York, Inc. v. Shah, the New York Court of Appeals addressed Department of Health regulations limiting executive compensation and administrative expenditures by healthcare providers receiving state funds. The Court upheld limits related to state funding, but struck down a limit that applied regardless of the source of funding.

In 2012, Governor Cuomo directed agencies providing state funding to service providers to regulate provider use of state funds for executive compensation and administrative costs. DOH responded with regulations restricting state-funded expenditures on administrative expenses and executive compensation for certain defined “covered providers.”

The regulations had two “hard caps,” one limiting administrative expenses to 15% of covered operating expenses paid with State funds, and one limiting the use of State funds for executive compensation to $199,000, absent a waiver. The regulations also had one “soft cap,” providing for penalties to a covered provider if executive compensation exceeded $199,000 from any source of funding, with specified exceptions concerning comparable provider compensation and board approval. Covered executives included those for whom salary and benefits were administrative expenses, and excluded clinical and program personnel.

Several petitioners challenged the regulations, including nursing homes, assisted-living programs, home-care agencies and trade associations.

The Court of Appeals grounded its decision in the separation of powers doctrine, which requires that “the Legislature make the critical policy decisions, while the executive branch’s responsibility is to implement those policies.” Chief Judge DiFiore looked to the Court’s prior decision in Boreali v. Axelrod for guidance in finding “the difficult-to-define line between administrative rule-making and legislative policy-making.”

The Court first reviewed the function of DOH, which manages state funds earmarked for public health, oversees the Medicaid program, and contracts with private entities. The Court said that DOH carries out these functions with the goal of ensuring that the limited public funding available be directed as efficiently as possible toward high-quality services.

The Court concluded that the hard cap regulations on both administrative expenses and executive compensation did not exceed DOH’s authority. The Legislature directed that DOH oversee the efficient expenditure of state health care funds. The hard caps are tied to the specific goal of efficiently directing state funds toward quality medical care for the public by limiting the extent to which state funds may be used for non-service-related salaries and disproportionately high administrative budgets. The Court found the hard cap regulations to be directly tied to the Legislative policy goal without subverting it in favor of unrelated public policy interests.

In contrast, the Court struck down the soft cap regulation, which restricted executive compensation over $199,000 regardless of funding source, because it represented “an unauthorized excursion by DOH beyond the parameters set by the Legislature.” The Court found that while the hard cap regulations capped the use of public funding, the soft cap imposed an overall cap on executive compensation, regardless of the funding source. “The soft cap thus pursues a policy consideration – limited executive compensation – that is not clearly connected to the objectives outlined by the Legislature but represents a distinct ‘value judgment.’” The soft cap restriction on executive compensation was not “sufficiently tethered” to the enabling legislation which largely concerned state funding. The Court concluded that the soft cap regulation exceeded DOH’s administrative authority as it envisioned the additional goal of limiting executive compensation as a matter of public policy.

All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that the hard cap on administrative expenditures was permissible, but the dissenting Judges differed on executive compensation.  Judge Garcia would have stricken both hard and soft caps on executive compensation, because they represented a “policy choice about reasonable compensation aimed at influencing corporate behavior,” which is “law-making beyond DOH’s regulatory authority.”  In contrast, Judge Wilson would had found both limits to be permissible.  He criticized the majority’s reliance on Boreali, and saw the proper analysis to be whether the regulation exceeded the executive power.  He would have used that rationale to uphold the hard cap on executive compensation, and also would have found the soft cap permissible because it advance the statutory goals of preventing providers from circumventing the hard cap and advising providers the State may allocate taxpayer funds away from undesireable or inefficient vendors and toward competitors who provide superior value.

At least where State funds are at issue, LeadingAge provides the Governor and executive agencies with broad authority to police and restrict the use of State funding.

 

            New York State does not require hospitals to insure medical malpractice claims, either through the purchase of commercial medical malpractice insurance or the establishment of an adequately funded self-insurance program.  New York has never required such insurance.  There are many hospitals which did not insure medical malpractice claims in the past, and a number that currently do not.

            Historically, the lack of insurance was often a matter of choice.  A number of community hospitals in the New York City area did not insure medical practice claims because they believed they would always be able to pay claims out of operations.  Others chose not to insure because they believed the lack of insurance improved their negotiating position with medical malpractice plaintiffs.  The hospitals would warn plaintiffs to settle their claims for what the hospitals considered reasonable amounts. If they did not, the hospitals would tell them that they would not be able to pay their claims and might have to resort to chapter 11 bankruptcy, where their malpractice claims would be general unsecured claims and receive pennies on the dollar.

            Attending physicians typically have malpractice insurance that covers claims against them individually for services they perform at the hospitals where they practice.  But physicians who are full-time employees of hospitals often do not have any individual malpractice insurance coverage; rather, they are dependent on their employers for it.

            Some hospitals, after “going bare” for a period of time and experiencing a large number of malpractice claims, are unable to purchase commercial medical malpractice insurance.  It is unclear whether they could have taken advantage of state programs established to enable them to purchase insurance for themselves and/or their physicians.  Although some of these hospitals set up self-insured programs, the programs were often inadequately funded.  When the hospitals experienced financial difficulties, the self-insurance reserves would often be used, in whole or in substantial part, to fund operating expenses.

            The lack of medical malpractice insurance or adequate self-insurance, needless to say, can be tragic for patients.  Patients may well be uninformed when admitted to a hospital that it is without medical malpractice insurance coverage or a sufficiently funded self-insurance program to fully compensate them if they are negligently injured during treatment or surgery.  Narratives of serious injuries caused by medical malpractice make for difficult reading, and an even worse ending if they cannot recover the damages to which they are entitled.

            Lack of malpractice insurance further raises issues for trade creditors, service providers and other unsecured creditors of the hospitals if the hospitals experience financial difficulties and file chapter 11.  Serious uninsured medical malpractice claims and large numbers of such claims, when added to the claims of other creditors, can greatly reduce the recovery of both malpractice claimants and business creditors in the chapter 11 cases of these hospitals.

            For more information, please contact Marty Bunin at 646-329-1982 or MBunin@FarrellFritz.com

New York State Court of Appeals, Albany, New York

Earlier this Summer, the Court of Appeals overturned the Appellate Division Third Department’s (the “Third Department”) unanimous decision in The Matter of Anonymous v. Molik, where it ruled that the New York State Justice Center for the Protection of People with Special Needs (“Justice Center”) exceeded its authority by substantiating a report against a facility or provider agency based upon a “concurrent finding” of neglect.[i]  With its decision, the Court of Appeals has not only clarified the Justice Center’s scope of authority, but also reopened the floodgates to a large number of investigations and appeals that have been existing in a state of limbo since the Third Department’s June 2, 2016 decision.[ii]

Pursuant to Executive Law §§ 551-562 and Social Services Law §§ 488-497, the Justice Center was established in 2013 to protect “vulnerable persons who receive care from New York State’s human services agencies.”[iii] It was created to protect all vulnerable persons, or those “who, due to physical or cognitive disabilities, or the need for services or placement, [are] receiving services from a facility or provider agency.”[iv]

All reportable incidents, including any allegation of neglect,[v] must be reported by a facility to the Statewide Vulnerable Persons’ Central Register (“VPCR”)[vi], whereby the Justice Center is mandated to investigate the allegation(s) and submit its findings to the VPCR.[vii]  The Justice Center’s findings are “based on a preponderance of the evidence and indicate whether the alleged abuse or neglect is substantiated in that it is determined the incident occurred and the subject of the report, facility or provider agency are responsible; or the allegation is found to be unsubstantiated because the event did not occur, or the subject of the report was found not responsible.”[viii] Additionally, the Justice Center may make “a concurrent finding . . . that a systemic problem [at the provider agency or facility] caused or contributed to the occurrence of the incident.”[ix]

In Molik, a male resident engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with a female resident after two staff members momentarily left a common room at the Petitioner’s facility.[x] This assault was the third incident in a six month period, with the previous two assaults being known to the Petitioner.[xi]  The Justice Center investigated the incident, but did not substantiate a report of neglect against the two individuals because “there were no policies or requirements in place prohibiting staff from leaving the room unattended while residents were gathered there.”[xii] However, since the male resident had previously engaged in similar conduct, the Justice Center substantiated a concurrent finding of neglect against the Petitioner, the operator of the residential facility, “for failing to implement clear staff supervision protocols and for failing to modify [the male resident’s] care plan to increase his level of supervision after the first two attacks.”[xiii]

The Petitioner requested that the Justice Center amend its finding to unsubstantiated, which was denied, leading to the Petitioner’s Article 78 action where it received unanimous support from the Third Department.[xiv]  In its decision, the Third Department overturned the Justice Center’s concurrent finding, stating that it did not have to “defer to the Justice Center’s interpretation of the statutory provisions in question . . . [but rather defer to the] pure statutory interpretation dependent only on accurate apprehension of legislative intent.”[xv] “[T]he only circumstance under which the Justice Center could substantiate a report of neglect against a facility or provider agency is where an incident of neglect has occurred but the subject cannot be identified — a situation that is plainly not present here.”[xvi] The Third Department continued by saying, while the Justice Center does, in fact, have the authority to make a concurrent finding, “the only concurrent finding that may be made is that a systemic problem caused or contributed to the occurrence of the incident.”[xvii] Accordingly, since the controlling statute did not provide the Justice Center with the clear ability to categorize a concurrent finding it necessarily followed that such a finding could not constitute neglect on the part of a provider agency.[xviii]

The Court of Appeals, however, did not share in the Third Department’s view, stating that courts may look beyond the literal text of a statute when “the plain intent and purpose of the statute would otherwise be defeated.”[xix] Consequently, the Court viewed the Petitioner’s, and the Third Department’s, narrow interpretation of the law as “leav[ing] the Justice Center powerless to address many systemic issues, defeating the purpose of the Act and preventing the Justice Center from protecting vulnerable persons where it is most critical to do so.”[xx]  The Court, in light of the particular underlying events in Molik, ruled that to uphold this construction “would perversely allow this dangerous cycle to continue: employee conduct could not be substantiated because it does not violate facility policies, but facility policies would remain ineffective because the Justice Center lacks authority to implement change.”[xxi]

In her dissenting opinion, Judge Rivera stated that she agreed with the majority that “[i]t would lead to absurd results if [N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 493(3)(a) were interpreted] to permit a facility or provider agency to be found responsible in those situations where an incident occurs and no subject can be identified, but not where an identified subject is found not responsible for a confirmed incident of abuse or neglect.”[xxii]  However, Judge Rivera points out that a ‘concurrent’ finding should be viewed as an ‘adjunct’, requiring that an initial finding of neglect must be made before a provider agency could be found to have concurrently committed neglect, even if the initial subject is ultimately found not responsible.[xxiii]  In Molik, as reasoned by Judge Rivera, the initial step of establishing a finding of abuse or neglect was never reached because the allegation of neglect against the two identified subjects was declared unsubstantiated; therefore, a ‘concurrent’ finding could not be made.[xxiv]

In a post-Molik world, it is imperative that all provider agencies subject to Justice Center oversight review their internal policies, procedures, and processes, understanding that they too are now clearly within the Justice Center’s reach.  Provider agencies should evaluate previous incidents that occurred within the facility to determine whether the necessary corrective actions have been taken or if further steps are needed.  Furthermore, staff training curriculum should be reevaluated to determine whether opportunities for improvement exist.

If you have any questions or would like additional information regarding the Justice Center, or would be interested in assistance reviewing, developing or revising your policies, processes, and training programs, please do not hesitate to contact Farrell Fritz’s Regulatory & Government Relations Practice Group at 518.313.1450 or NYSRGR@FarrellFritz.com

————————————————————————————————————————

[i] Anonymous v. Molik, 2018 WL 3147607 (N.Y. Jun. 28, 2018).

[ii] Matter of Anonymous v. Molik, 141 A.D.3d 162, (App. Div. 3 Dep’t, June 2, 2016)

[iii] 14 N.Y.C.R.R. § 700.1(a).

[iv] N.Y. Soc. Servs. Law § 488(14).

[v] 14 N.Y.C.R.R § 624.3(b)(8).

[vi] N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 492(1)(a).

[vii] Id. at (3)(c)(i); Id. at (3)(c)(viii); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 493(1).

[viii] N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 492(3)(a).

[ix] Id. at (3)(b).

[x] Molik, 2018 WL 3147607 at *1.

[xi] Id.

[xii] Id.

[xiii] Id.

[xiv] Id. at *2.

[xv] Molik, 141 A.D.3d. at 166 (internal citations omitted).

[xvi] Id. at 167 (citing N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 492(3)(a)).

[xvii] Id. at 167–168 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[xviii] Id.

[xix] Id. at *4.

[xx] Molik, 2018 WL 3147607 at *5.

[xxi] Id.

[xxii] Id. at 8

[xxiii] Id. at 9.

[xxiv] Id. at 10.

 

Just over one year ago, I wrote about the Department of Health and Human Service’s (“HHS”) $105 million award to support 1,333 federally qualified health centers (“Health Centers”) across the United States improve the quality of comprehensive care provided to patients. It seems like déjà vu, as it was announced last month that HHS set aside $125 million in quality improvement grants to be allocated among 1,352 Health Centers. A list of recipients can be found here.

Health Centers receive funding through the Health Resources and Services Administration (“HRSA”), a branch of the federal government with a primary purpose of delivering comprehensive healthcare to patients who cannot otherwise afford such care. Treatments offered at Health Centers, include, without limitation, physician services, homebound visits by nurses in geographic locations where home health agencies are sparse, and clinical psychology services. The overarching goals set by HRSA with respect to Health Centers are to:

  • Make available high quality healthcare treatments and ancillary services, including education and transportation to facilities;
  • Offer care at affordable rates and charge patients in accordance with a practical scale;
  • Have community stakeholders serve on the governing boards to communicate the specific needs of the locality; and
  • Create a patient-centered foundation to address the diverse needs of the medically underserved.

In accordance with those goals, the grants are designed to improve Health Centers. Specifically, the funds will be used for “[e]xpanding access to comprehensive care, improving care quality and outcomes, increasing comprehensive care delivery in a cost-effective way, addressing health disparities, advancing the use of health information technology, and delivering patient-centered care.”

Speaking on the new grants and reflecting on the preceding year, HRSA Administrator George Sigounas, MS, Ph.D., said “[n]early all HRSA-funded health centers demonstrated improvement in one or more clinical quality measures from the year prior, and these funds will support health centers’ work to improve the quality of care they deliver in their communities around the country.”

As healthcare costs continue to rise in many parts of the country, eligible patients have an alternative route to obtain affordable healthcare without the burdens associated with visiting the local hospital. Health Centers are a bright spot in an otherwise gloomy healthcare system.

 

 

 

 

 

 

This post is written in connection with my colleague Vanessa Bongiorno’s recent post, where she eloquently summarized the New York Department of Health’s (“DOH”) findings of the multi-agency study on the impact of regulated adult-use marijuana in New York.

In the report, DOH found that even though marijuana use does contain risks, there are benefits associated with implementing a regulated adult-use marijuana program, including positive impacts on New York’s criminal justice system and an alternative to opioid use, which has long impacted so many New Yorkers and their families. The DOH report concluded with, among other things, a recommendation that New York establishes a workgroup of subject matter professionals with relevant public health experience to debate the details of a regulated marijuana program and offer solutions consistent with reducing harm and educating the public.

Governor Andrew M. Cuomo accepted the recommendation and recently announced the creation of a workgroup to help draft legislation for regulated adult-use marijuana, which will be overseen by Alphonso David, an advisor to the Governor. The workgroup consists of professors of major New York educational institutions, law enforcement representatives, governmental stakeholders, and mental health experts, to name a few. A full list of workgroup members can be found here.

Speaking on the development, Governor Cuomo stated “[t]he next steps must be taken thoughtfully and deliberately. As we work to implement the report’s recommendation through legislation, we must thoroughly consider all aspects of a regulated marijuana program, including its impact on public health, criminal justice and State revenue, and mitigate any potential risks associated with it.”

It is abundantly clear that New York is serious about adopting a regulated marijuana program. While the details of such program are beginning to be hashed out, New York’s long anticipated debate over regulated adult-use marijuana appears to be coming to a resolution.

 

This past July 26, 2018 was the 28th anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), landmark civil rights legislation designed to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities. Specifically, the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in employment, state and local government, public accommodations, commercial facilities, transportation and telecommunications. It protects anyone with a “disability”, defined as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” which include but are not limited to “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” This is clearly a broad list – and consequently, the ADA impacts many individuals and organizations on almost a daily basis.

ADA requirements impact the healthcare sector no less than any other sector, and more than most. In particular, the 2002 Supreme Court case of Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999), held that the ADA requires individuals with disabilities receiving services from the state to be served in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs –meaning in practice that they must be served in community settings rather than institutions if that (1) is appropriate, (2) is not opposed by the recipient, and (3) can be reasonably accommodated taking into account the resources available to the state and the needs of others. That case specifically addresses individuals with mental disabilities residing in a psychiatric hospital, but courts subsequently extended the principle to individuals with other disabilities in other settings, and has helped to drive healthcare policy nationwide, particularly in the long term care space.

To coordinate the implementation of the Olmstead decision, in late 2002 New York State established the Most Integrated Setting Coordinating Council, an interagency council comprised of representative of various state agencies that attempted to address the Olmstead mandate in a coordinated way. Governor Cuomo expanded on that effort in 2012, when he issued an Executive Order establishing the Olmstead Plan Development and Implementation Cabinet, a similar collection of agency representatives charged with issuing recommendations on how best to implement the Olmstead mandate. The Cabinet issued a report in October 2013 that identified four areas of focus: (1) the need for strategies to address specific populations in unnecessarily segregated settings, including psychiatric centers, developmental centers, intermediate care facilities, sheltered workshops and nursing homes; (2) the general need to increase opportunities for people with disabilities to live integrated lives in the community; (3) the need to develop consistent cross-systems assessments and outcome measurements regarding how New York meets the needs and choices of people with disabilities in the most integrated setting; and (4) the need for strong Olmstead accountability measure. This report informed many of the subsequent reforms implemented by Governor Cuomo in the health and human services space.

On July 26, 2018, the Governor expanded the State’s commitment to the ADA and furthered the State’s Olmstead compliance by announcing the first phase of the “Able New York” agenda, a series of regulatory initiatives designed to enhance the accessibility of a variety of state programs and services. This first phase focuses on the Department of Health (DOH), and includes a series of policy initiatives aimed at supporting community living for individuals with disabilities. Specifically, the Governor has charged DOH to take the following actions:

  • Dear Administrator Letter: DOH will issue a “Dear Administrator Letter” (DAL) to all nursing facilities reminding them of their obligations to provide assistance to any resident that wishes to return to the community. DALs are a form of subregulatory guidance used by DOH to set policy without issuing a formal regulation.
  • Immediate Need Program: DOH will issue new guidance to Local Divisions of Social Services regarding the immediate need program for authorizing personal care services. The Immediate Need Program, which was established pursuant to legislation enacted in 2015, is not a separate program so much as a set of procedures requiring expedited eligibility and assessment determinations for individuals who (1) have no informal caregivers, (2) are not receiving needed assistance from a home care services agency, (3) have no third party insurance or Medicare benefits available to pay for needed assistance, and (4) have no adaptive or specialized equipment or supplies that meet their need for assistance. In such cases, Medicaid eligibility must be determined within seven days. DOH has been instructed to intervene in counties that are not complying with the program.
  • MLTC Housing Disregard: DOH will provide education to nursing homes, adult homes, local governments, and Managed Long Term Care (MLTC) plans about the MLTC Housing Disregard, which provides nursing home residents who are discharged back to the community with additional housing allowance should they join a MLTC plan.  The Housing Disregard was established in 2013, and allows individuals to retain a dollar amount per month for housing without jeopardizing their Medicaid eligibility. The amount varies by region. In order to be eligible for the disregard, a person must (1) be at least 18 years of age, (2) have been a resident of a nursing home for at least 30 days, (3) have had nursing home care paid by Medicaid; (4) require community-based care for more than 120 days; and (5) have a housing expense such as rent or mortgage.

In addition to the foregoing, DOH will also “explore” (but presumably not necessarily implement) the following measures: 

  • Certification of Assessment & Discharge Education: DOH might require Medicaid-enrolled nursing homes to certify each year that they have (a) assessed all residents’ functional capacity; (b) asked residents about their interest in receiving information regarding returning to the community; and (c) provided sufficient preparation and orientation to residents to ensure safe and orderly discharge from the facility.
  • HCBS Evaluations as Part of Certificate of Need Review:  DOH might require any new application for additional nursing home beds or change of ownership to include, as part of its business plan, an assessment of the home and community based services (HCBS) in the service area, a description of its current or planned linkages to such HCBS services, and how its admission policies will ensure that residents are placed in the most appropriate and least restrictive setting. 
  • Discharge Rights Letter and Notice: DOH might require all nursing homes to inform residents and their families and representatives in writing of their discharge rights, including information on HCBS and community transition programs. DOH might also require all nursing homes to publicly post information regarding available resources and services that can assist residents in moving to the community, and explore additional ways to highlight discharge options. DOH may also engage the Long Term Care Ombudsman Program on this effort.
  • Nursing Home Discharge Incentive: DOH might incentivize nursing home discharges by developing a quality metric that rewards facilities that discharge long stay residents to the community, provided those residents are successfully maintained in the community for at least 90 days.

Thus, the new guidance to be issued by DOH to nursing homes and other long term care provider could be significant, particularly if it includes a new quality incentive for discharges. Even if DOH opts not to implement any of the proposed new initiatives, the obligations to be outlined in the new DAL could still impose significant new regulatory requirements on nursing home administrators.

We will continue to monitor the implementation of this phase of the Able New York agenda, as well as future phases. For additional information on this or other legislative or regulatory matters, please do not hesitate to contact Farrell Fritz’s Regulatory & Government Relations Practice Group at 518.313.1450 or NYSRGR@FarrellFritz.com.